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The Frontiers of Human Rights:
Reflections on the Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Judgments in
Omar Khadr 2008 and 2010
Alex Neve*

I. INTRODUCTION
There are a number of important issues packed into the Supreme
Court’s relatively concise 48-paragraph judgment in Omar Khadr released on January 29, 2010.1 In this paper, I will focus on one very
important issue that arises in the case: the extraterritorial reach of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 In particular, I will consider
the ramifications, if any, of just one sentence, one that is not a statement
of the Court’s conclusion on the question of extraterritoriality, but which
may or may not be of considerable significance:
As a general rule, Canadians abroad are bound by the law of the
country in which they find themselves and cannot avail themselves of
3
their rights under the Charter.

The Court went on of course to state an exception to this general rule
and did find that the Charter had extraterritorial application in Khadr
2010. The question, though, is whether it is significant that the Court
specified citizenship — it referred specifically to “Canadians abroad” —
in stating the general rule, but not when framing the exception to the
rule. Where does this leave non-citizens whose rights may be infringed
by the actions of Canadian officials acting outside Canada?

*
1

Secretary General, Amnesty International Canada.
Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] S.C.J. No. 3, 2010 SCC 3 [hereinafter “Khadr

2010”].
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
Khadr 2010, supra, note 1, at para. 14 (emphasis added).
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This is a vitally important issue in human rights advocacy. Do human
rights have frontiers? How far does a state’s obligation to refrain from
human rights violations extend? Does it begin and end at home? Does it
reach out onto the world stage? Are there borders when it comes to the
obligation to uphold human rights? If so, where should they be drawn?
For human rights advocates, the struggle to secure recognition of the
principle that governments do indeed have very real and very serious
obligations to protect human rights beyond their own borders is critical.
It plays out in a variety of contexts.
•

It arises with respect to the actions of law enforcement and security
personnel, who may become directly or indirectly involved in the arrest, imprisonment and interrogation of individuals — perhaps their
own nationals, perhaps not — in other countries, in situations where
serious violations of the rights of those individuals, including torture,
are a virtual certainty.

•

It arises when soldiers go abroad and go to war, keep the peace or
carry out other sorts of military operations — perhaps under a United
Nations (“UN”), North Atlantic Treaty Organization or other banner,
perhaps through a bilateral arrangement with another government —
and find themselves, either on the battlefield or off, drawn into situations where violations of international human rights or international
humanitarian law provisions are occurring.

•

It arises when large companies, headquartered in one country and
bound by the domestic laws and international obligations of that
country, set up operations in another country, perhaps a country with
a much weaker legal framework, and then become somehow implicated in human rights violations associated with their operations or
even their mere presence.

•

It arises through the aid and development policies and projects one
government approves or launches in another country which may,
well-intentioned or not, contribute to or even be the source of human
rights violations.

In all of these situations, officials often insist that it would be inappropriate to interfere in another state’s affairs by applying our own laws.
It would be an affront to the sovereignty of the other state. Instead, the
argument is generally made that we must look to the law of the country
where the violations are taking place for a remedy.
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The issue has received considerable legal, political and public attention in Canada in recent years, through a number of cases arising in a
variety of contexts — with very different dynamics and outcomes. In the
case of Maher Arar, for instance, the government accepted, without hesitation, the findings of a public inquiry as to the responsibility Canadian
officials bore for the serious human rights violations Mr. Arar experienced in the United States, Jordan and Syria.4 He received considerable
compensation.
However, even though a judicial inquiry headed by former Supreme
Court of Canada Justice Frank Iacobucci similarly found numerous instances of Canadian responsibility for human rights violations
experienced by Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou Elmaati and Muayyed
Nureddin in Syria and/or Egypt,5 government lawyers are this time aggressively fighting their claim for compensation and a lengthy legal
battle looms. And court proceedings launched by Abousfian Abdelrazik,
seeking compensation for the imprisonment and torture he experienced
in the Sudan — in which the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(“CSIS”) seems deeply implicated — also face strong government objections, including an insistence that it should not be allowed to go ahead
because the violations occurred outside Canada.6
As we all know, the Supreme Court did extend human rights protection extraterritorially — through section 7 of the Charter in both Khadr
20087 and Khadr 2010. I am going to compare and contrast how the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of extraterritoriality in those cases with
how the issue was handled in another recent high-profile case — prisoner
transfers in Afghanistan.
In 2008, as part of an application launched by Amnesty International
and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, the Federal Court8
4

Commission of Inquiry Into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar,
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar (2006) (The Honourable Dennis O’Connor, Commissioner), online <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/
www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm>.
5
Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki,
Ahmed Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin (2008) (The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, Q.C., Commissioner), online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/iacobucci-e/final_
report/final-report-copy-en.pdf>.
6
Paul Koring, “Abdelrazik Sues Ottawa for $27 Million”, The Globe and Mail (September
24, 2009); Paul Koring, “Abdelrazik’s Lawyers Pressing Court to Hold Cannon Accountable”, The
Globe and Mail (April 11, 2010).
7
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khadr 2008”].
8
Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Chief of the Defence Staff), [2008] F.C.J. No.
356, 2008 FC 336, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 546 (F.C.).
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and the Federal Court of Appeal9 both concluded that the Charter did not
travel abroad with Canadian soldiers when they headed off to Afghanistan. Unfortunately the Supreme Court declined to hear a further
appeal.10
For Amnesty International, what is at stake in these cases is compliance with international human rights obligations. That necessitates
understanding the nature and scope of those obligations. It also means
considering the means to enforce those obligations, which inescapably
requires looking to national level courts because of the lack of meaningful international-level mechanisms for enforcement. In a Canadian
context, and many other countries as well, that further necessitates considering the role of national laws, such as the Charter, because
international human rights standards cannot be independently enforced in
Canadian courts.

II. BEYOND BORDERS: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Let me begin at the international level. It is becoming increasingly
clear and accepted that international human rights obligations can and do
extend beyond the borders of any one particular state. The treaties themselves envision that possibility.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for instance, applies to all persons “within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction”.11 The UN Human Rights Committee, the expert body
charged with responsibility for overseeing the Covenant, has clearly
stated that “[t]his means that a State party must respect and ensure the
rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the
State party.”12 Furthermore, the Committee has made it very clear that
“the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality
9
Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Chief of the Defence Staff), [2008] F.C.J. No.
1700, 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 4 F.C.R. 149 (F.C.A.).
10
Application for leave to appeal dismissed (May 21, 2009), Amnesty International v. Canada (Canadian Forces), [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 63 (S.C.C.).
11
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, art. 2(1).
12
United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 [80], Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13
(May 26, 2004), at para. 10.
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or statelessness …, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to
the jurisdiction of the State Party”.13 The Committee concludes that this
“principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of
the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained,
such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party assigned
to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation”.14
Similarly, the UN Committee against Torture, charged with overseeing the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, has stated that the obligations under that Convention, which are framed as extending to “any territory
under [a State Party’s] jurisdiction”15 means all areas where the state
“exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto
effective control, in accordance with international law”.16 The Committee
provides numerous examples therefore of where this may arise, including
a “ship or aircraft registered to the state, during times of military occupation or peacekeeping operations, and in such places as embassies,
military bases, detention facilities, or other areas over which a State exercises factual control”.17
The Committee applied this recently in a case involving Denmark,
noting that Danish military forces may have violated the Convention
against Torture when they handed prisoners apprehended during fighting
in Afghanistan to the custody of allied forces in early 2002, prisoners
who were allegedly then ill-treated in detention.18 The Committee noted
that the Convention applies to Danish forces “wherever situated” and
even if they are under the operational command of another state.19
A recent groundbreaking study on secret detention and counterterrorism, carried out by four UN human rights experts responsible for
torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and counterterrorism, makes it clear that international human rights treaties do have
13

Id.
Id.
15
United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36, art. 2(1).
16
United Nations Report of the Committee against Torture 2008, General Assembly Official Records, 63rd session, Supplement No. 44, Annex VI, General Comment no. 2, 1, IV, at para.
16.
17
Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by
States Parties, CAT/C/GC/2 (January 24, 2008), at para. 16.
18
Committee against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against
Torture: Denmark, CAT/C/DNK/5 (July 16, 2007).
19
Id., at para. 13.
14
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extraterritorial reach.20 The experts note, for instance, that a “State party
must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant [on Civil
and Political Rights] to anyone within the power or effective control of
that State party, even if not situated within the territory of the State
party”.21 They note as well the International Court of Justice’s Advisory
Opinion in the case dealing with construction of the wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory. In that case the court concluded that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights extends to “acts done by a
state in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside of its own territory”.22
So it is settled that international human rights obligations do indeed
extend beyond a country’s territory. The key is to determine whether the
individual or individuals — nationals or non-nationals — whose rights
are on the line are within the “power or effective control” or somehow
have been caught up in the state exercising its jurisdiction, even though
outside of its own territory.
Notably, the Supreme Court had no difficulty in concluding that
when Canadian security and intelligence officials interrogated Omar
Khadr at Guantánamo Bay on three different occasions between February
2003 and March 2004, they did participate in processes that violated
Canada’s international human rights obligations.23 The Court reached
that conclusion even though the agents were some 3,000 kilometres from
home, operating in a prison facility under the jurisdiction of one foreign
state, the United States, located within the territory of another foreign
state, Cuba. The Court noted, in particular, violations of the Geneva
Conventions by virtue of the denial of the right to challenge the legality
of detention at Guantánamo Bay by way of a habeas corpus application.24
It is not so clear though when it comes to prisoners apprehended by
Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan and held pending transfer to the custody of Afghan officials where they face a serious risk of being tortured,
20

Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin; Special Rapporteur on Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak; Working Group on Arbitrary Detention represented by its Vice-Chair, Shaheen Sardar Ali; and the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances represented by its Chair, Jeremy Sarkin; Joint Study on
Global Practices in relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism,
A/HRC/13/42 (February 19, 2010).
21
Id., at para. 37.
22
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Report 2004 (July 9, 2004), at para. 111.
23
Khadr 2008, supra, note 7, at paras. 21-27.
24
Id., at paras. 21 and 25.
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particularly at the hands of Afghanistan’s notorious National Directorate
of Security. Neither the Federal Court25 nor the Federal Court of Appeal26
offered an opinion as to whether Canada’s international human rights
obligations have been violated. In the Federal Court judgment, Canada’s
international obligations are referenced as a preferable legal framework
to the Charter, noting, for instance that the “appropriate legal regime to
govern the military activities currently underway … is the law governing
armed conflict — namely international humanitarian law”.27 Justice Mactavish noted in particular that while she has concluded that the Charter
does not apply, the detainees do “have the rights conferred on them by
international law, and, in particular, by international humanitarian law”.28
She noted as well that should the actions of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan “violate international humanitarian law standards”, they could,
among other scenarios, “potentially face sanctions or prosecutions under
international law”29 including even the possibility of “proceedings before
the International Criminal Court”.30 However, she reached no conclusion
as to whether any of those international legal obligations have in fact
been breached.

III. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN A DOMESTIC
CONTEXT: THE CHARTER AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
There may well be, at least in the Khadr cases, violations of Canada’s international human rights obligations. However, as we know in
Canada’s dualist system, that does not, on its own, offer a direct route to
a Canadian court. If there was a meaningful system for enforcing human
rights obligations at the international level, it might not be necessary to
look for domestic avenues for enforcement. But there is very little available for holding the state itself, and its institutions, to the international
obligations it has assumed. Thus, in a Canadian context, the Charter becomes key.
I would like to look at the progression of five key cases, with Khadr
2008 and Khadr 2010 being central, in considering this interplay be-

25
26
27
28
29
30

Supra, note 8.
Supra, note 9.
Supra, note 8, at para. 276.
Id., at para. 343.
Id., at para. 344.
Id., at para. 345.
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tween international human rights obligations, extraterritoriality and the
Charter.
It starts with the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Hape.31 Mr.
Hape, convicted on two counts of money laundering, had argued that
Charter guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure should protect him from the joint operations of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(“RCMP”) and Turks and Caicos police when they raided his company,
downloaded computer information and seized some 100 boxes of material — all outside Canada — and that the evidence obtained should be
excluded at trial. The Court ruled that the Charter did not apply and that
RCMP conduct was governed by applicable Turks and Caicos laws.
But writing for the majority, LeBel J. famously left the door open for
extraterritorial application of the Charter, noting that “deference [to the
foreign state] ends where clear violations of international law and fundamental human rights begin”.32 He went on to state that “the principle
of comity may give way where the participation of Canadian officers in
investigative activities sanctioned by foreign law would place Canada in
violation of its international obligations in respect of human rights”.33
And further:
I would leave open the possibility that, in a future case, participation by
Canadian officers in activities in another country that would violate
Canada’s international human rights obligations might justify a remedy
under s. 24(1) of the Charter because of the impact of those activities
34
on Charter rights in Canada.

In Hape, had the Court signalled some sort of international human
rights exception to the general rule that the Charter does not apply outside Canada? It was unclear. Some of LeBel J.’s words seem clear
(“deference ends”). But others seem permissive and uncertain (“may give
way”; “I would leave open the possibility”).
Next comes Federal Court Justice Anne Mactavish’s ruling in the
Afghan prisoner transfer case.35 She was not prepared to accept that the
Hape decision had created what she termed a “fundamental human rights
exception to the general rule against the extraterritorial application of the
Charter”.36 In her view, to conclude that the “nature or the quality of the
31
32
33
34
35
36

R. v. Hape, [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 52.
Id., at para. 101.
Id.
Supra, note 8.
Id., at para. 308.
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Charter breach ... creates extraterritorial jurisdiction, where it does not
otherwise exist ... would be a completely unprincipled approach to the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction”.37 She concluded instead that the
Hape majority was simply saying that “Canadian officials operating outside of Canada cannot act in a way that violates Canada’s international
human rights obligations — quite independently of any obligations they
might otherwise have under the Charter”.38
Then the issue came before the Supreme Court once again, in Khadr
2008, with judgment rendered only two months after Mactavish J.’s Afghan prisoners ruling. And suddenly the uncertainty that was inherent in
three different concurring opinions in Hape, and the less than certain
language of the majority, gives way to remarkable certainty:
In Hape, the Court stated an important exception to the principle of
comity. While not unanimous on all the principles governing
extraterritorial application of the Charter, the Court was united on the
principle that comity cannot be used to justify Canadian participation in
activities of a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s
international obligations. ...
If the Guantanamo Bay process under which Mr. Khadr was being held
was in conformity with Canada’s international obligatrions, the Charter
has no application and Mr. Khadr’s application for disclosure cannot
succeed: Hape. However, if Canada was participating in a process that
was violative of Canada’s binding obligations under international law,
39
the Charter applies to the extent of that participation.

The Court then went on to assess whether the Guantánamo Bay
process, at the time that CSIS officers handed over the products of its
interviews with Omar Khadr to U.S. officials, was a process that violated
Canada’s binding obligations under international law.40 The Court concluded that it was in violation of those obligations and that the Charter
therefore does apply.41
The logic seemed to be on point with the Afghan prisoner situation.
Applying the same reasoning — the same “important exception” — if
the process of transferring prisoners to a situation where they faced a
serious risk of torture was “violative of Canada’s binding obligations
37
38
39
40
41

Id., at para. 311.
Id., at para. 316.
Khadr 2008, supra, note 7, at paras. 18-19.
Id., at paras. 19-26.
Id., at para. 26.
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under international law”, then surely the Charter did apply. The UN Convention against Torture, for one, is very clear in prohibiting the
refoulement of an individual to officials of another state if there is a serious risk he or she will be tortured.
Seven months later, the Afghan prisoners case was before the Federal
Court of Appeal.42 And the argument that in Khadr 2008 the Court had
clarified and enshrined a clear international human rights exception to
the general rule that the Charter did not have extraterritorial reach was
summarily dismissed. Justice Desjardins concluded that she understood
the Supreme Court of Canada to say that deference and comity end
where clear violations of international law and fundamental human
rights begin. This does not mean that the Charter then applies as a
consequence of these violations. Even though section 7 of the Charter
applies to “[e]veryone ...” (compare with the words “[e]very citizen ...”
in section 6 of the Charter) all the circumstances in a given situation
43
must be examined before it can be said that the Charter applies.

Is she signalling a distinction based on the fact that Omar Khadr is a
Canadian citizen and prisoners apprehended by Canadian forces in Afghanistan are not? She had earlier emphasized, for instance, that “the
factual underpinning of this [Khadr 2008] decision is miles apart from
the situation where foreigners, with no attachment whatsoever to Canada
or its laws, are held in [Canadian Forces] detention facilities in Afghanistan”.44 That comment seems discordant with the later acknowledgment
that section 7 does apply to everyone whereas other Charter provisions
that are limited to citizens are specifically worded in restricted terms.
Five months later, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in the
Afghan prisoners case,45 passing up an important opportunity to bring
some coherence to this increasingly confusing line of cases on extraterritoriality.
Then the Khadr 2010 appeal made its way to the Supreme Court, and
once again extraterritoriality was in the spotlight. The Court reiterated a
very straightforward and clear approach to extraterritoriality, noting that
“as a general rule, Canadians abroad are bound by the law of the country
in which they find themselves and cannot avail themselves of their rights
under the Charter” but stressing that “the jurisprudence leaves the door
42
43
44
45

Supra, note 9.
Id., at para. 20.
Id., at para. 14.
Supra, note 10.
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open to an exception in the case of Canadian participation in activities of
a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international
obligations or fundamental human rights norm”.46 For authority the
Court referred to both Hape and Khadr 2008. As it did in Khadr 2008,
the Court went on to conclude in Khadr 2010 that as the “same underlying series of events at Guantánamo Bay (the interviews and evidencesharing of 2003 and 2004)” were at the basis of the claim, the same
rationale for applying the Charter governed.47

IV. EXTRATERRITORIALITY: IS IT A MATTER OF CITIZENSHIP?
Which leaves us where? Is there now a clearly articulated international human rights exception to the general rule that the Charter does
not have extraterritorial application? If so, why was the Supreme Court
not interested in hearing an appeal in the Afghan prisoners case so as to
clarify and consolidate the law in this area? Is there an unexpressed distinction at play related to the citizenship of the individuals whose rights
are at stake?
It has arisen recently in another case, very similar — almost identical
to Omar Khadr — but for one key factor: the applicants lacked Canadian
citizenship. And the Federal Court48 and the Federal Court of Appeal49
both concluded that citizenship is a key distinguishing factor when determining whether particular provisions of the Charter, and in particular
section 7, apply in a given extraterritorial context. The issue arose in the
case of Mohamedou Slahi and Ahcene Zemiri, both non-Canadians who
lived in Canada for extended periods and both of whom, like Omar
Khadr, ended up in detention at Guantánamo Bay. Both, again like Mr.
Khadr, were questioned at Guantánamo Bay several times by Canadian
officials — the same timeframe as Mr. Khadr in fact. Both brought Federal Court applications seeking disclosure of the information obtained
during those interrogations, the same issue that was before the Supreme
Court in Khadr 2008.
To situate these within the chronology of the other cases, the decisions in Slahi and Zemiri came down after Khadr 2008 and also after the
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal Afghan prisoners judgments
46
47
48
49

Khadr 2010, supra, note 1, at para. 14.
Id., at para. 18.
Slahi v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2009] F.C.J. No. 141, 2009 FC 160 (F.C.).
Slahi v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2009] F.C.J. No. 1120, 2009 FCA 259 (F.C.A.).
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came down, but before the Supreme Court decided Khadr 2010. As with
the Afghan prisoners litigation, the Supreme Court dismissed an application for leave to appeal the Slahi and Zemiri case, less than three weeks
after releasing the Khadr 2010 ruling.50
In Slahi and Zemiri, Federal Court Justice Blanchard concluded on
the basis of the Court’s Khadr 2008 ruling that “the Charter would apply
to the Canadian officers participating in the interviews of the Applicants
in Guantanamo Bay, since they too were involved in a process that violates Canada’s international law obligations”.51 Having found that the
Charter applied, he then went on to determine the scope of section 7’s
extraterritorial reach and concluded that it did not extend to the applicants, because of their lack of citizenship. Justice Blanchard concluded
that:
What emerges from the noted jurisprudence is that, in the three cases of
Canadian nationals claiming abroad, non-Canadians claiming within
Canada, and non-Canadians claiming abroad, for section 7 Charter
rights to apply, the circumstances must connect the claimant with
Canada, whether it be by virtue of their presence in Canada, a criminal
52
trial in Canada, or Canadian citizenship.

The Federal Court of Appeal agreed, concluding that “Khadr is distinguishable on the ground that Mr. Khadr is a Canadian citizen, whereas
the appellants are not. Further, there are no proceedings pending in Canada against the appellants which might provide a nexus to Canada.”53
Unfortunately, Khadr 2010 provides no further elucidation as to the
Supreme Court’s views as to whether a Canadian nexus is required and,
if so, what sort of nexus that should be, in order for section 7 of the Charter to have extraterritorial application in a case where Canadian officials
have been drawn into activities abroad that contravene Canada’s international human rights obligations. The statement of the general rule against
extraterritorial application of the Charter does specify citizenship: “Canadians abroad … cannot avail themselves of their rights under the
Charter.”54 However, we have no indication as to whether the Court considers Canadian citizenship, which obviously was not an issue in Mr.
50
Application for leave to appeal refused (February 18, 2010); Zemiri v. Canada (Justice),
[2009] S.C.C.A. No. 446 (S.C.C.); application for leave to appeal refused (February 18, 2010); Slahi
v. Canada (Justice), [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 444 (S.C.C.).
51
Supra, note 48, at para. 36.
52
Id., at para. 47.
53
Supra, note 49, at para. 4.
54
Khadr 2010, supra, note 1, at para. 14.
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Khadr’s case, to be a crucial element of the international human rights
exception to the general bar on extraterritorial application of the Charter.
As a sidenote, Mr. Zemiri was released and returned to Algeria on
January 20, 2010. On March 22, 2010, a U.S. District Court judge ordered Mr. Slahi’s release. The U.S. government has filed a notice of
appeal of that decision and he remained at Guantánamo Bay as of April
2010.
On the basis of both Khadr 2008 and Khadr 2010, there does appear
to be a clearly recognized principle that Canadian citizens can turn to the
Charter for protection if Canadian officials have been drawn into violations of their internationally protected rights in a foreign country. That
right has been circumscribed, however, by the Federal Court and Federal
Court of Appeal rulings in Slahi and Zemiri, an almost identical case involving non-citizens. The Courts held that while the Charter applies in
such situations, section 7 can only be invoked if the individual concerned
has a sufficient nexus to Canada.
International human rights standards draw no distinction, however,
when it comes to citizens and non-citizens.55 If an individual is within the
power, effective control or jurisdiction of a state, international human
rights standards apply, even when the activity in question takes place
abroad. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in Boumediene,56 the British
House of Lords in Al-Skeini,57 and the European Court of Human Rights
in Loizidou58 (and also in Bankovic59) have all recognized versions of a
test of effective control over an individual, in all instances non-citizens,
as the basis for finding extraterritorial reach of human rights laws. The
issue is once again before the European Court of Human Rights in the
British case, Al-Skeini.
The Supreme Court has declined to take up this issue two times over
the past year: dismissing an application for leave to appeal in the Afghan
prisoner case in May 2009 and in Slahi and Zemiri in February 2010.
One hopes that they will not pass a third time and will have the opportunity to clarify the nature and scope of the international human rights
exception in the near future, and to do so in a manner that is consistent
with international human rights standards and does not discriminate and
set out two tiers of human rights protection for citizens and non-citizens.
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